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ABUSIVE DISCRETION: DISCRETIONARY AND
SUPPLEMENTAL TRUSTS CREATED IN
SETTLEMENT OF PERSONAL INJURY
CLAIMS
Abstract: Discretionary and supplemental trusts are often created in settlement of per-
sonal injury lawsuits to shield the settlement proceeds from the beneficiary's care-pro-
vider's claims. Washington courts provide no clear direction on creditor access to such
trusts. This Comment argues for a legislative provision in Washington that makes these
trusts accessible to creditors who provide necessities to an injured party. This Comment
argues for allowing access regardless of any discretion or supplemental support language
in the trust, because these trusts are self-settled and violate public policy.
In settlement of a personal injury claim, parties may establish a
trust' fund in an attempt to shield the settlement proceeds from credi-
tors of the injured party. Creditors include doctors, hospitals, other
care providers, or even the state or federal government. Parties fre-
quently set up the trust as a spendthrift trust, so the beneficiary cannot
assign away the beneficiary's interest, and as a discretionary and sup-
plemental trust, so the beneficiary's creditors cannot force payment
from the trust. The creditors, as a result, often are not compensated
and must initiate lengthy and expensive litigation and negotiation to
seek reimbursement.
Consider a child who suffers severe birth defects allegedly caused by
medical malpractice. Shortly after birth, the State of Washington
declares the child dependent and places the child in foster care with a
full-time nurse.2 Later, the parents, the guardian, and the physicians
settle a malpractice claim by setting up a discretionary trust for the
benefit of the child. The parties may stipulate an additional provision
that the trust should be used only to supplement any state-paid care.
The agreement also states that the trust corpus will go to the parents
upon the death of the child. The State of Washington (or other private
creditor) that has covered the cost of the child's care requests reim-
bursement from the fund for prior and future costs of care. The trust-
ees deny the claim, citing their discretionary powers and the trust's
supplemental nature. The creditor possesses no clear path to reim-
bursement under Washington statutes or case law.
1. A trust consists of property held by a trustee for the benefit of a beneficiary. The trust
property is the trust corpus, and the person who establishes the trust is the settlor. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 782, 181, 714 (5th ed. 1983).
2. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.34.030 (West Supp. 1991). Once a child is declared
dependent by a court, the state assumes the cost of caring for the child, and may place the child
in a foster-care home.
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This Comment analyzes the current law of trusts in Washington
and concludes that, because of the unsettled nature of creditor rights
to collect against trusts created in settlement of legal claims, a legisla-
tive provision allowing for such access should be enacted. Both logic
and public policy support greater creditor access in these cases. Settle-
ment trusts are self-settled and refusing creditor access to such funds
abuses the relationships between the parties and can lead to double
recovery.
I. INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF TRUST
INSTRUMENTS IN WASHINGTON
In interpreting a trust instrument, Washington courts ascertain the
purpose of the settlor and effectuate that intent insofar as consistent
with rules of law.' In determining the settlor's intent, courts consider
primarily the language of the trust instrument itself, absent an ambi-
guity in the document.4
The following sections will describe the three basic types of trusts
recognized in Washington: spendthrift trusts that contain explicit or
statutory provisions prohibiting alienation of the beneficiary's interest;
discretionary trusts that contain provisions granting discretion to the
trustees in making payments to the beneficiary; and support trusts that
provide that the proceeds must be used to furnish support to the bene-
ficiary. In addition, the issue of self-settled trusts, wherein a benefici-
ary settles a trust for himself or herself, will be addressed.
A. Spendthrift Trusts
Spendthrift trusts restrict alienation by the beneficiary.5 Express
provisions in the trust document can establish the spendthrift restric-
tions, or a statutory spendthrift rule can apply.6 In either case, the
beneficiary cannot alienate the beneficiary's interest nor can the benefi-
3. Seattle First Nat'1 Bank v. Crosby, 42 Wash. 2d 234, 246, 254 P.2d 732, 740 (1953).
4. Waits v. Hamlin, 55 Wash. App. 193, 199, 201, 776 P.2d 1003, 1007-08, review denied, 113
Wash. 2d 1025, 782 P.2d 1071 (1989).
5. See Erickson v. Bank of Cal., N.A., 97 Wash. 2d 246, 249-50, 643 P.2d 670, 672 (1982); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 152, 153 (1959) (spendthrift clause blocks
alienation by beneficiary and creditor collection against trust); GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE
T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTES § 227 (rev. 2d zd. & Supp. 1991) (valid
spendthrift clause blocks the usual methods of collection against a trust, including execution,
attachment and bankruptcy).
6. See Erickson, 97 Wash. 2d at 249-50, 643 P.2d at 672; WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 6.32.250 (West Supp. 1991); Crosby, 42 Wash. 2d at 243, 254 P.2d at 738.
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ciary's creditors reach it, except where the creditor has provided
necessities to the beneficiary. 7
Spendthrift trusts in Washington can be created in two ways.
Express spendthrift provisions in the trust instrument constitute one
method of creation.8 Washington courts, under Erickson v. Bank of
California, N.A., 9 uphold such provisions, and do not allow the benefi-
ciary to sell, assign, or encumber the beneficiary's interest in the
trust.10 In Erickson, a mother's testamentary trust instrument stated
that the beneficiaries' interests in the principal and income "shall not
be subject to claims of the respective beneficiary's creditors.., nor to
legal process, and shall not be voluntarily or involuntarily assigned,
alienated or encumbered."'" One of the beneficiaries incurred bills for
doctors, ambulance services, utilities and hospitals, then filed bank-
ruptcy."2 The Washington Supreme Court upheld the validity of
spendthrift trusts. 3 The court stated that a property owner who sets
up a trust should have the right to put enforceable restraints on aliena-
tion of the beneficiary's interest, thus preventing a creditor from tak-
ing that interest away. 4 The court reasoned that a property owner
should be able to dispose of property in any way he or she wishes, as
long as the actions do not violate public policy. 5
The second method of creating a spendthrift trust in Washington
comes from the statutory spendthrift rule, which treats trusts that do
not contain express spendthrift language as spendthrift trusts.16 The
practical effects of the rule cause virtually all trusts in Washington to
take on spendthrift properties, at least insofar as collection efforts by
creditors are concerned.1 7
7. Erickson, 97 Wash. 2d at 252-53, 643 P.2d at 673 (adopts Restatement (Second) of Trusts
§ 157 approach allowing for creditor collection against a spendthrift trust for "necessary services
rendered to the beneficiary or necessary supplies furnished to him").
8. See id. at 249-50, 643 P.2d at 672.
9. 97 Wash. 2d 246, 643 P.2d 670 (1982).
10. See id. at 249-50, 643 P.2d at 672.
11. Id. at 249, 643 P.2d at 672.
12. Id. at 253-54, 643 P.2d at 674.
13. Id. at 250, 643 P.2d at 672 (referring to Milner v. Outcalt, 36 Wash. 2d 720, 219 P.2d 982
(1950)).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. See WASH. REV. CoDE ANN. § 6.32.250 (West Supp. 1991); Seattle First Nat'l Bank v.
Crosby, 42 Wash. 2d 234, 243, 254 P.2d 732, 738 (1953); see also Thomas Read, Comment,
Spendthrift Trusts in Washington, 58 WASH. L. REV. 831 (1983).
17. Crosby, 42 Wash. 2d at 243, 254 P.2d at 738; Erickson v. Bank of Cal., N.A., 97 Wash. 2d
246, 249, 643 P.2d 670, 672 (1982).
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Courts bar most creditor claims against spendthrift trusts.18 Courts
bar both voluntary and involuntary alienation of the beneficiary's
interest, including attempts at collection through garnishment, levy
and bankruptcy 9 proceedings against the beneficiary."0
Courts do recognize one exception to the general bar on creditor
claims against spendthrift trusts. Where a creditor provides necessary
goods or services to the beneficiary, courts allow access to the trust.21
Medical care, food, clothing and lodging qualify as necessary goods
and services.22
Because of the necessities exception, spendthrift trusts created in
settlement of personal injury claims pose little difficulty for the benefi-
ciary's legitimate care-providers. This Comment therefore does not
advocate changes in Washington's spendthrift laws. The Comment
does, however, use concepts from spendthrift trust law, including the
Ninth Circuit's treatment of spendthrift settlement trusts, to argue for
creditor access to discretionary and supplemental settlement trusts.23
B. Pure Discretionary Trusts
A pure discretionary trust contains language that gives the trustee
full discretion in disbursement of funds from the trust, with no
requirement to provide for the beneficiary's support.24 For example,
the trust instrument could state that the trustees shall distribute as
much of the income and principal to John Doe as they, in their sole
and unfettered discretion, deem appropriate.25 The discretion lan-
guage can cover the trust income, principal or both.26 Purely discre-
tionary trust instruments give trustees nearly complete control over
the amount of distribution to beneficiaries, 27 barring an abuse of dis-
18. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 152, 153 (1959); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra
note 5, § 227.
19. Under federal bankruptcy rules, creditors may collect only from the "bankruptcy estate."
In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352, 1359-60 (9th Cir. 1985), cert denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986). Valid
spendthrift trusts fall outside the bankruptcy estate. Id.
20. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 227.
21. See eg., Erickson, 97 Wash. 2d at 252-53, 643 P.2d at 674.
22. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157 illus. 3-4 (1959).
23. See infra notes 100-13 and accompanying text.
24. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) Of TRUSTS §§ 155, 187 (1959); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra
note 5, § 228; Lawrence Frolik, Discretionary Trusts for a Disabled Beneficiary: A Solution or a
Trap for the Unwary?, 46 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 335, 342 (1985).
25. Cf. BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 228; Ivey v. Grogan, 243 S.E.2d 874 (Ga. 1978).
26. See Frolik, supra note 24, at 352.
27. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 228; see also RE"TATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 187 (1959).
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cretion.28 Because the beneficiary of a discretionary trust cannot force
the trustees to make payment from the trust, any transferee or creditor
of the beneficiary likewise cannot force payment out of the trust.29
Unlike spendthrift trusts, creditors that provided necessary services or
supplies to the beneficiary have no power to force payment from a
discretionary trust.30
An exception to the general doctrine of deference to discretionary
trustees may exist when a parent-child support relationship exists
between settlor and beneficiary, l although this question remains
undecided in Washington. For example, California's Probate Code
makes a discretionary trust created by the child beneficiary's parent
liable to the state for the beneficiary's support.32 The duty of parents
to support their minor children provides the rationale for allowing
creditor access.33
Discretionary trusts created in settlement of personal injury claims
pose a significant problem for the beneficiary's care-providers because
courts are reluctant to force distribution from such trusts.3 4 This
Comment argues for allowing creditor access to discretionary settle-
ment trusts.35
C. Pure Support, Discretionary Support, and Supplemental Support
Trusts
The following sections describe the three general forms of support
trusts: pure support trusts, discretionary support trusts, and supple-
mental support trusts. Judicial interpretation of each will be
addressed.
28. See, e.g., Peoples Nat'1 Bank v. Jarvis, 58 Wash. 2d 627, 630, 364 P.2d 436, 439 (1961);
Monroe v. Winn, 16 Wash. 2d 497, 508, 133 P.2d 952, 958-59 (1943) (abuse of discretion
involves misappropriation of funds, bad faith, or dishonesty); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRusTs § 187 cmt. j (1959).
29. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 228.
30. Id.
31. See, eg., CAL. PROB. CODE § 15306 (West 1991).
32. Id.; see also Julianne Sartain, Comment, Probate Code Section 15306: Discretionary Trusts
as a Financial Solution for the Disabled, 37 UCLA L. REV. 595, 608-09 (1990).
33. Sartain, supra note 32, at 611. Washington also places a support obligation on the parent.
In re Rudonick, 76 Wash. 2d 117, 456 P.2d 96 (1969).
34. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 228, at 512-13; see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 (1959).
35. See infra notes 100-36 and accompanying text.
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L Pure Support Trusts
Pure support trusts contain language requiring the trustees to apply
income, principal, or both to the support of the beneficiary.36 For
example, the instrument could say: "The trustees shall distribute as
much of the income as necessary to provide a reasonable level of sup-
port to the beneficiary."' 37 Trustees of support trusts have some inher-
ent discretion over the amount of disbursement, but if the trustees do
not provide at least a reasonably sufficient support level, Washington
courts will force payment from the trust.38 Typically, the beneficiary's
creditors can force payment from a support trust if the creditors pro-
vided support goods or services to the beneficiary.39
Because creditors can collect against support trusts where the credi-
tors have provided support to the beneficiary, support trusts created in
settlement of personal injury claims pose no probEem for the benefici-
ary's care-providers. Therefore, this Comment does not propose
changes in Washington's basic support trust laws. The basic support
trust concept does, however, form a basis for understanding discre-
tionary support trusts and supplemental support trusts, discussed
below.
2. Discretionary Support Trusts
Trust instruments sometimes contain both support and discretion
language that causes difficulty in interpreting the instrument. Courts
interpret these trusts, sometimes known as discretionary support
trusts,' in differing ways. Some courts interpret such trusts as discre-
tionary trusts,4 1 while others interpret them as support trusts.42 Wash-
ington appears to interpret such trusts as support trusts. 43 Therefore,
some authority exists in Washington for allowing creditors to gain
access to trusts when creditors provide support goods and services to
36. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 229, at 519.
37. Cf RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 154 (1959).
38. Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Crosby, 42 Wash. 2d 234, 244, 254 P.2d 732, 739 (1953); see
also BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 229; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187 cmt.
i, illus. 11 (1959).
39. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 229; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 157
(1959); see also supra note 22 and accompanying text.
40. See Evelyn Abravanel, Discretionary Support Trusts, 68 ICWA L. REv. 273, 279-80
(1983); see also Frolik, supra note 24, at 353-54.
41. See, e.g., First Natl Bank v. Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 399 A.2d 891
(Md. 1979).
42. See, eg., Bureau of Support in Dep't of Mental Hygiene and Correction v. Kreitzer, 243
N.E.2d 83 (Ohio 1968).
43. See Erickson v. Bank of Cal., N.A., 97 Wash. 2d 246, 643 P.2d 670 (1982).
442
Vol. 67:437, 1992
Discretionary Settlement Trusts
the beneficiary. However, that authority stands on a narrow holding,
leaving creditors vulnerable.'
Some states adopt the approach represented by First National Bank
v. Department of Health,45 and interpret these dual-nature trusts as
primarily discretionary trusts, insulated from creditor claims.' In
First National Bank the trust instrument stated that the trustees shall
pay "the net income and so much of the principal as they, in their
absolute and uncontrolled discretion, may determine, to [the benefici-
ary] ... or, in their absolute and uncontrolled discretion, may apply
the same for her maintenance, comfort and support."'4 7 Under the
trust instrument, any funds remaining after the beneficiary's death
would go to the settlor's son or other children and not to the benefici-
ary's estate.48 The beneficiary had no interest in the remainder of the
trust.49 The state filed a claim with the trustees for reimbursement for
care of the beneficiary. 0 In responding to the state's claim, the trust-
ees paid over the trust income, but refused to pay any more, even
though the income failed to cover the full cost of the beneficiary's state
hospital care.51 The state, in suing to collect against the trust princi-
pal, argued that the support terminology should take priority over the
discretion language, but the court rejected the argument.52 The court
stated that the trust instrument clearly indicated the intent of the set-
tlor to establish a discretionary trust and the additional support lan-
guage only served to restrict the uses to which the fund could be
applied.53 Consequently, the court barred the state's claim because the
state showed no abuse of discretion, defined as the trustees acting "dis-
honestly or arbitrarily or from an improper motive."'54 The court con-
cluded, therefore, that discretionary support trusts enjoy insulation
from creditor claims, even if the creditors provided support to the
beneficiary. 55
Contrary to the approach exemplified by First National Bank some
states interpret the dual-nature discretionary support trusts as primar-
44. See infra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
45. 399 A.2d 891 (Md. 1979).
46. See Abravanel, supra note 40, at 282-83.
47. First Nat'l Bank, 399 A.2d at 892.
48. IM at 892-93.
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 893.
52. Id. at 895.
53. Id. at 895-96.
54. Id. at 896.
55. Id
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ily support trusts, thereby allowing some creditor claims against the
fund.5 6 Washington appears to take a position contrary to First
National Bank Washington's approach, outlined in Erickson v. Bank
of California, N.A., 5 7 may apply only in very narrow circumstances.
The court in Erickson examined a trust instrument that stated:
"Trustees shall use so much of the net income and principal of the
trust.., as in their sole discretion is necessary for the.., support...
of each living child [beneficiary]." 8 The trust also contained explicit
spendthrift provisions. 9 Under the instrument, the children would
receive the corpus of the trust upon reaching particular ages and the
trust would be wound up.' The beneficiaries therefore had a future
interest in the trust principal. 61 Creditors that provided necessary hos-
pital, medical, and other services to one of the child-beneficiaries later
tried to collect against the trust.62 The Washington Supreme Court,
interpreting the trust language, stated that the settlor in this case
intended that necessities of life would be provided by trust funds, and
that the beneficiary had a vested future interest in the trust corpus.63
The court concluded that suppliers of necessary goods and services
should be able to reach the beneficiary's interest in the trust, whether
or not the withholding of payment is properly within the discretion of
the trustee.64 The court then remanded the case for determination of
whether the goods and services provided to the beneficiary qualified as
"necessities." '65 Consequently, in the narrow 'context of discretionary
support trusts where the instrument indicates the settlor's intent to
provide support to the beneficiary and the beneficiary owns a vested
future interest in the trust remainder, Washington courts will force
distribution for the beneficiary's support.
Discretionary support trusts created in settlement of personal injury
claims seriously impair collection efforts by the beneficiary's care prov-
iders. The Erickson decision only weakly supports collection efforts by
creditors.66 Therefore, this Comment argues for allowing creditor
56. See, e.g., Bureau of Support in Dep't of Mental Hygiene & Correction v. Kreitzer, 243
N.E.2d 83, 84-86 (Ohio 1968) (on virtually identical facts as First Nat'l Bank court required
provision of at least minimal support).
57. 97 Wash. 2d 246, 643 P.2d 670 (1982).
58. Id. at 248 n.1, 643 P.2d at 671 n.1.
59. Id. at 249, 643 P.2d at 672.
60. Id. at 248, 643 P.2d at 671.
61. See id.
62. Id. at 253-54, 643 P.2d at 674-75.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 253, 643 P.2d at 674.
65. Id. at 254, 643 P.2d at 675.
66. See infra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
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access to discretionary support trusts created in settlement of personal
injury claims even if the beneficiary has no future interest in the trust.
3. Supplemental Support Trusts
A third type of support trust, recognized by some commentators
and courts as a supplemental support trust,67 contains language stat-
ing that the trust shall provide support to the beneficiary only over and
above any state-provided support.61 In interpreting supplemental sup-
port trusts, courts find the settlor's intent to supplement the available
care as controlling.69 Consequently, courts do not allow the state to
terminate state-provided benefits merely because the recipient stands
as a supplemental trust beneficiary.70
Similar to discretionary trusts, supplemental support trusts created
in settlement of personal injury claims can hamper collection efforts by
the beneficiary's care providers. This Comment argues for allowing
creditor access to supplemental support trusts created in settlement of
personal injury claims.
D. Self-Settled Trusts
If the settlor of any of the trusts discussed above also occupies the
position of beneficiary of the same trust, then courts will classify the
trust as self-settled.71 Settlors commonly set up trusts for their own
benefit, with spendthrift provisions, in an attempt to shield assets from
creditors. For example, a settlor could create a trust for himself or
herself before declaring bankruptcy. 7 The settlor does this believing
that the spendthrift or discretion provision will prevent the settlor's
creditors from forcing payment from or collecting against the trust.
Virtually all courts, however, routinely pierce through trust language
preventing alienation if the trust is self-settled.73 Courts applying
common law or statutes throw out both spendthrift7' and discretion
language in these cases to prevent beneficiaries from defrauding credi-
67. Sartain, supra note 32, at 597, 616-17; Frolik, supra note 24, at 337.
68. Sartain, supra note 32, at 616-17; Frolik, supra note 24, at 337.
69. See Lee Russ, Annotation, Eligibility for Welfare Benefits as Affected by Claimant's Status
as Trust Beneficiary, 21 A.L.R. 4TH 729, 732-33 (1983).
70. E.g., Zeoli v. Commissioner of Social Serv., 425 A.2d 553, 559 (Conn. 1979); Town of
Randolph v. Roberts, 195 N.E.2d 72, 74 (Mass. 1964).
71. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156 (1959); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note
5, § 223.
72. See, e.g., In re White, 61 B.R. 388 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1986).
73. William Wicker, Spendthrift Trusts, 10 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 7 (1974).
74. Id.; White, 61 B.R. at 392; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(1) (1959).
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tors by placing assets beyond the creditor's reach. 5 Consequently, the
beneficiary's creditors can collect against self-settled trusts regardless
of any restriction language in the instrument. Even creditors that did
not provide support or necessities to the beneficiary can collect against
a self-settled trust.76
A trust not explicitly self-settled may be considered such by the
courts. For example, in In re Jordan, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals held as self-settled a spendthrift trust created in settlement of
a tort action.7 7 Jordan, a railroad worker, lost a leg during a railcar
derailment and filed a claim against his employer.78 Pursuant to a
settlement agreement, the defendant attempted to establish an explicit
spendthrift annuity trust for Jordan.7 9 Subsequently, Jordan declared
bankruptcy and several creditors sued to gain access to the trust. The
court considered the trust self-settled, because the money placed in the
trust was directly traceable to a personal injury suffered by him." Jor-
dan owned the cause of action, the settlement of which resulted in the
deposit of money in the trust.81 Because the original cause of action
would be includable in the bankruptcy estate had it not been settled,
the court reasoned that the trust fund resulting from the settlement of
that cause of action should also be included. 2 The court considered
the trust part of Jordan's bankruptcy estate, such that the trust was
reachable by his creditors in the bankruptcy proceeding.83 Jordan
stands for the general proposition that spendthrift trusts created in
settlement of legal claims can be reached by creditors, at least in a
bankruptcy proceeding. 4
75. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.36.020 (West 1989) (a transfer by a debtor in trust for
his own use is void as against his creditors); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 156(2)
(1959); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 228, at 514-19.
76. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 223, at 438-39, § 228, at 517.
77. In re Jordan, 914 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1990).
78. Id. at 198.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 199.
81. Id.
82. See id.; see also Sierra Switchboard Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 789 F.2d 705 (9th
Cir. 1986) (holding that a plaintiff's unsettled claim for emotional distress was includable in the
plaintiff's bankruptcy estate). Note that valid, non-self-settled spendthrift trusts do not become
part of the bankruptcy estate. See In re Daniel, 771 F.2d 1352, 1359-60 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986).
83. Jordan, 914 F.2d at 200.
84. See also De Rousse v. Williams, 164 N.W. 896 (Iowa 1917); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 156 cmt. f, illus. 2 (1959) (if a person contests a will, and in settling the contest the
estate creates a spendthrift trust in contestant's favor, then contestant provided consideration for
the trust, thereby self-settling it); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, §§ 41, 223 (if persons
procure, even indirectly, the settlement of trusts for their benefit, then they have self-settled the
trusts); cf Security Trust Co. v. Sharp, 77 A.2d 543 (Del. 1950) (husband-wife reciprocal trusts
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This Comment argues that discretionary and supplemental trusts
created in settlement of personal injury claims are self-settled by the
tort claimant." Consequently, the Jordan logic should be extended to
cover the discretionary or supplemental settlement trust situation.
II. WASHINGTON LAW SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN
FAVOR OF GRANTING ACCESS TO
DISCRETIONARY AND SUPPLEMENTAL
TRUSTS TO CREDITORS WHO PROVIDE
SUPPORT TO THE BENEFICIARY
Due to the narrowness of the Erickson holding, 6 the legality of col-
lection against most discretionary and supplemental trusts remains
unresolved in Washington. Erickson provides little guidance in deal-
ing with such trusts created in settlement of legal claims.
Creditors should have access to discretionary and supplemental
trusts created in settlement of personal injury claims for four reasons.
First, trusts created in settlement of legal claims are self-settled, so
they should not be insulated from creditor claims. Second, in many
personal injury cases, the relationship between plaintiff and defendant
constitutes one of support. The law should not allow abuse or altera-
tion of the relationship by allowing parties to create discretionary and
supplemental settlement trusts insulated from claims by care-provid-
ers. Third, creditor access to trust funds should be allowed in order to
avoid double recovery by parents in child-injury cases. Finally, the
current unresolved nature of the law on creditor rights against these
discretionary and supplemental settlement trusts produces uncertainty
and unfairness to creditors, resulting in excessive litigation. These
problems indicate that the Washington statutes should be amended to
provide for creditor access to discretionary and supplemental trusts
created in settlement of legal claims.
A. Legality of Collection Against Discretionary Trusts by Creditors
Remains Largely Unresolved in Washington
The Washington statues on trusts should be amended to allow col-
lection by creditors who provide support to a beneficiary of a discre-
tionary trust created in settlement of a personal injury claim because
Washington case law fails to provide for collection. The Erickson
considered self-settled). But see Everett v. Peyton, 60 N.E. 423 (N.Y. 1901) (abandoning will
contest held not to result in self-settled trust).
85. See infra notes 100-13 and accompanying text.
86. See infra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
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decision resolves the issue of creditor access to discretionary trusts
only in the narrow circumstance where the trust instrument estab-
lishes discretionary support provisions and the beneficiaries have a
vested future interest in the trust principal. 7 The case does not extend
to all discretionary trusts for two reasons.
First, the debtor beneficiary in Erickson had a vested future interest
in the trust remainder. The trust instrument stated that once all the
children reached the age of twenty-two, the trustees were to divide the
trust corpus into equal shares and distribute it to the children when
they reached twenty-seven years.88 If a child died before distribution
of the corpus, the child's share would go to the child's issue.8 9 No
contingency existed because each beneficiary, or the beneficiary's
estate, was guaranteed to receive a proportional share of the trust
corpus. The beneficiaries therefore had a vested interest in the remain-
der of the trust.' The court recognized the vested interest when it
allowed a beneficiary's creditors to collect against the trust.91 The
court emphasized that the beneficiary declared bankruptcy six months
and six days prior to the date he would receive his vested interest. 92
The court noted that if he had declared bankruptcy "just 7 days later,"
then his creditors could have gotten the trust assets under the Bank-
ruptcy Act.93 The court stated that "[w]e cannot condone this obvi-
ous attempt to benefit from obtaining necessary goods and services
without paying for them," and allowed access even though the Bank-
ruptcy Act did not mandate such access.94 The court recognized that
the beneficiaries owned all the trust. The only question was when the
beneficiaries would get the trust corpus, not whether they would get it
at all.
Erickson provides only indirect support for the proposition of credi-
tor access to discretionary trusts, because many such trusts, unlike the
trust in Erickson, leave the remainder to a person other than the cur-
rent beneficiary. 95 If the current beneficiary of a discretionary trust
87. See infra notes 88-99 and accompanying text.
88. Erickson v. Bank of Cal., N.A., 97 Wash. 2d 246, 248, 643 P.2d 670, 671 (1982).
89. Id.
90. Cf BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 809 (5th ed. 1983).
91. Erickson, 97 Wash. 2d at 253-54, 643 P.2d at 674.
92. Id.
93. Id. (emphasis in original). Section 70(a) of the Bankruptcy Act (now § 541 of the
Bankruptcy Code) provides that inheritances vesting in the bank.upt individual within six
months of bankruptcy shall be included in the bankruptcy estate, reachable by creditors in the
bankruptcy proceeding. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (West 1979 & Supp. 1991).
94. Erickson, 97 Wash. 2d at 254, 643 P.2d at 674.
95. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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was not entitled to the remainder, Erickson probably would not
apply.96
The second reason why Erickson does not clearly resolve the issue of
creditor access to discretionary trusts is that Erickson involved a dis-
cretionary support trust, not a pure discretionary trust.97 In granting
creditor access to the Erickson trust, the court emphasized that it was
implementing the stated intent of the settlor to provide support to the
beneficiary.98 Washington courts would be less likely to apply the
Erickson approach to a trust containing only discretion language or
discretion and supplemental support language, because that would
directly contravene the settlor's intent.99
Consequently, where discretionary or supplemental trusts are cre-
ated in settlement of legal claims, the narrowness of the Erickson hold-
ing forces creditors and providers of necessities to resort to negotiation
and litigation in attempting collection. If the beneficiary owns no
vested interest in the trust remainder, and the trust contains only dis-
cretion language and no support language, or only supplemental sup-
port language, Erickson does not apply, and creditors cannot
confidently rely on that case in arguing for collection. Because of the
gap that remains unfilled following Erickson, creditors in many cases
have no clear path to relief.
B. Creditors Should Have Access to Discretionary and Supplemental
Support Trusts Created in Settlement of Personal Injury Claims
Washington statutes should be amended to provide for creditor
access to settlement trusts for several reasons. First, settlement trusts
are self-settled. Second, in many cases a support relationship exists.
Third, double recovery can occur if courts deny creditor access.
Finally, the unresolved nature of the law on creditor rights produces
uncertainty and unfairness to creditors, leading to excessive litigation.
96. See also Avera v. Avera, 315 S.E.2d 883 (Ga. 1984) (Husband settled trust for himself,
income for life, remainder to his children. Court allowed wife's claim for alimony and child
support from income only and not from remainder interest.); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 155 cmt. e (1959) (for a discretionary support trust, if the remainder of the trust is to
go to a person other than the current beneficiary or his estate upon the death of the beneficiary,
then the current beneficiary's creditors or transferee cannot reach it); BO3GERT & BOGERT, supra
note 5, § 223 (current beneficiary's creditors cannot reach remainder interest if the remainder is
to go to a third person, even if the beneficiary had self-settled the trust).
97. Erickson, 97 Wash. 2d at 248, 643 P.2d at 671.
98. The Erickson court stated that "[t]he settlor of this trust would also undoubtedly
disapprove of [the beneficiary's] effort to defraud the suppliers of necessities for which the settlor
intended to provide." Id. at 254, 643 P.2d at 674.
99. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
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1. Trusts Created in Settlement of Legal Claims are Self-Settled
Courts should treat any trusts created as a result of a settlement as
self-settled and refuse to allow the beneficiary to shield trust assets
from creditors. Self-settled spendthrift or discretionary trusts some-
times are used in an attempt to shield assets from creditors."° As a
result, courts refuse to block creditor claims against self-settled
trusts. 10 This reasoning could also apply to the settlement context.
In the settlement context, the beneficiary owns the cause of action,
which he or she trades away in consideration for establishing the trust.
The beneficiary therefore indirectly creates the trust.
The Ninth Circuit uses this approach in the context of spendthrift
trusts created in settlement of legal claims."0 2 In In re Jordan, 103 the
settlor established a spendthrift trust for a beneficiary, in settlement of
a personal injury case pursued by the beneficiary as plaintiff against
the settlor as defendant."° The court held the trust self-settled by the
beneficiary because the money placed in the trust could be directly
traced to a personal injury suffered by the beneficiary.105
Similarly, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts and several cases sup-
port the view that settlement of a claim gives rise to a self-settled
spendthrift trust.106 The Restatement offers an illustration: If a person
settles a will contest by accepting a spendthrift trust in that person's
favor, then that person provided consideration for the trust, thereby
self-settling it."°7 Consequently, the trust can be reached by the indi-
vidual's creditors.108
The logic of Jordan and the Restatement apply equally well to a
discretionary or supplemental support trust case. In Jordan, the court
focused on the origin of the trust rather than its specific provisions."
The spendthrift nature of the trust did not alter the fact that the bene-
ficiary (or guardian) gave up a legal cause of action-a valuable prop-
erty right-as consideration for the defendant setting up a trust
100. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
102. See In re Jordan, 914 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1990).
103. 914 F.2d 197 (9th Cir. 1990).
104. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
106. See, eg., De Rousse v. Williams, 164 N.W. 896 (Iowa 1917); REsTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TRUSTS § 156 cmt. f, llus. 2 (1959); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, §§ 41, 223; supra note
83 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
108. See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
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fund."' In the settlement context, the beneficiary owns the considera-
tion which he or she trades for the trust fund. The beneficiary has
essentially made an indirect payment of money to establish the
trust."11 Therefore, the analysis for a self-settled trust should not be
affected by the nature of the trust, whether spendthrift, discretionary,
or supplemental. All trusts created in settlement of personal injury
claims should be considered self-settled.
Funds created in settlement of legal claims are self-settled and so
the beneficiary's creditors should have access to the fund regardless of
any discretion or supplemental language in the trust instrument. Self-
settled discretionary or supplemental trusts, like self-settled spend-
thrift trusts, provide no protection against collection by the benefici-
ary's creditors.1 2 Creditors can force payment from self-settled
discretionary trusts up to the extent of the trustee's discretion.' 1 3
Applying this reasoning to trusts created in settlement protects inno-
cent creditors; creditors who provided satisfactory goods or services in
reasonable expectation of payment and who have no connection with
the loss suffered by the beneficiary. Because of the self-settled nature
of settlement trusts, Washington should enact a legislative provision
allowing collection against such trusts by the beneficiary's creditors.
2. When a Support Relationship Exists Between Settlor and
Beneficiary of a Settlement Trust, Creditors Should Be
Able to Collect Against the Trust
Often, when a settlement results in the creation of a trust, a support
relationship exists between the settlor and the beneficiary similar to
the support component of the parent-child relationship. In such cases,
the defendant may have a duty to support the plaintiff.1 4 A support
relationship between the settlor and beneficiary argues for invalidation
of discretionary and supplemental language in a trust formed in
settlement."I5
110. See supra note 82 and accompanying text (bankruptcy law considers causes of action
part of the bankruptcy estate, and therefore reachable by the bankrupt's creditors).
111. Money paid directly to the plaintiff, who then puts the money in a trust fund, results in a
self-settled trust. For example, in Farmers State Bank v. Janish, 410 N.W.2d 188 (S.D. 1987),
the survivors of an accident, as plaintiffs, received and put the settlement proceeds into a
spendthrift trust. Later, a creditor of one of the survivors attempted garnishment against the
trust. The court allowed the garnishment, stating that because the survivor was both a settlor
and a beneficiary, the spendthrift provisions were void as against creditors. Id
112. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 156(2) (1959); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 5, § 228, at 514-19.
114. See infra notes 119-22 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
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In the context of a parent-child relationship, courts sometimes
pierce through a trust's discretionary language to allow the care-prov-
iders to claim for support. 11 6 A support relationship between a settlor
and beneficiary means that the trust, even if discretionary, is accessible
for the beneficiary's support.1 17 For instance, California allows a ben-
eficiary's creditors to collect against a purportedly discretionary trust
when the beneficiary's parent settles the trust.118 A parent cannot
change or abuse the terms of the relationship by setting up a discre-
tionary trust, possibly of the entire estate, leaving the dependent per-
son without an assured means of support.
A support relationship exists in many personal injury cases. Sup-
port costs constitute a significant part of the settlement or judgment in
many personal injury damages awards. 119 In calculating damages,
juries and judges commonly consider estimated future support as part
of the award.' 2° A defendant can be liable for future support costs
such as nursing care, medical care, and even everyday living expenses
when the defendant is liable for lost future wages.12 The injured
party may not be able to earn a sufficient income to cover the party's
support costs.122 Thus, the resulting liability may result in a support
obligation, much like the parent-child relationship considered by the
California statute.
The existence of a support relationship in personal injury cases sug-
gests that discretionary or supplemental language in a settlement trust
should be pierced in these cases. By circumventing the restrictive lan-
guage, courts can make the support relationship operate unimpeded,
and prevent the relationship from being abused by the parties in an
attempt to shelter assets. Money should go from the defendant to sup-
port the plaintiff beneficiary, and not into a trust protected from sup-
port liability.
3. Allowing Creditor Access Would Avoid Double Recovery
Creditors should have access to discretionary and supplemental set-
tlement trusts so as to avoid double recovery by plaintiff trust-benefi-
ciaries. Particularly in the case of an injured child, a significant
116. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
118. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
119. Support costs arise in the form of future medical care and services, and lost future wages.
See, e.g., Christopher v. United States, 237 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Pa. 1965).
120. See id. at 800 (the $702,666 judgment included $310,352 for estimated future support
costs for the plaintiff, in terms of lost future wages and medical expense caused by the injury).
121. Cf id. at 797-99 (discussion of award for lost future wages and future medical care).
122. Cf id. at 797 (injured party has diminished earning capacity).
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possibility of double recovery exists if courts refuse creditor access to a
discretionary or supplemental support trust created in settlement of
the claim. Creditors such as hospitals, doctors or even state govern-
ments may incur costs of caring for the child, because the parents and
child have insufficient funds to cover the large medical bills.123 If
creditors are denied access to the trust created by the defendant, the
trust may sit untouched during the child's life. Later, if the child pre-
deceases the parents, the trust fund goes to the parents. 124 The parents
have, in essence, recovered twice for the child's injuries: once from the
creditors and once from the trust fund.
Notwithstanding the tragedy of an injured victim's plight, double
recovery violates public policy. 125 Compensation for tort claims
should serve to shift the loss to the responsible person as opposed to
granting a windfall to the injured party. Where private compensation
for an injury is available in the form of a trust, no compelling reason
exists for forcing care providers such as physicians, hospitals, or the
state to bear the loss. Concepts of tort law suggest that losses should
be borne by the parties that are at least somewhat responsible for the
lbss, and not by those with no fault whatsoever.126 Entities that pro-
vide necessary care to injured victims do not deserve to suffer the loss
when the responsible party, such as a negligent physician or auto
driver, provides compensation under a settlement in trust. The double
recovery problem would be avoided if creditors were allowed to collect
against discretionary and supplemental trusts created in settlement of
personal injury claims. The trust fund would be the only source of
recovery, used to pay for legitimate support costs for the injured party.
4. A Provision Allowing for Creditor Access to Discretionary and
Supplemental Support Trusts Would Reduce Uncertainty
and Provide for More Fair Treatment of Creditors
Allowing creditor access to discretionary and supplemental trusts
would reduce the uncertainty and unfairness inherent in denying
access. In attempting to collect against discretionary or supplemental
trusts, some creditors undoubtedly get no reimbursement at all. Cred-
itors are denied payment either because the cost of litigating the ques-
tion would outweigh the potential recovery or because the creditor
123. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
124. The trust instrument could grant the parents a vested remainder interest in the trust
corpus. Even if the trust instrument does not grant the parents a remainder interest, the parents
likely would take the trust because the parents stand as the child's intestate heirs.
125. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTs § 1 (5th ed. 1984).
126. See id. §§ 1, 3.
453
Washington Law Review
lacks sufficient legal sophistication to negotiate a payment in the
absence of clear law upon which to rely. A creditor's ability to get
payment for care given to the beneficiary should not depend primarily
upon the creditor's resources to litigate or negotiate each case. The
law could provide more reliable and fair collection by creditors if it
provided a standard rule for creditor access to trusts created in com-
promise of legal claims.
Denial of creditor access to settlement trusts simply allocates the
loss unfairly to the creditors that happened to provide for the benefici-
ary. When the culpable party has paid compensation in the form of a
trust, fairness dictates that the fund, not the wholly innocent creditors,
should bear the beneficiary's financial loss resulting from the injury. 127
Allowing for creditor access against trusts created in settlement of
injury claims is more fair to wholly innocent parties.
In addition, allowing for creditor access would encourage health-
care providers such as doctors and hospitals to provide care to tort
injury victims who may not have adequate health insurance. If courts
deny creditor access, healthcare providers may be reluctant to care for
underinsured tort victims because they fear that they will be unable to
collect the costs of care from the beneficiary or trust. 128 Allowing for
creditor access allows the tort system to perform the key function of
providing support for the injured party.
5. Allowing Collection Against Settlement Trusts Does Not
Contravene the Public Policy of Encouraging Gift Trusts
in Favor of Disabled Persons
Public policy encourages the creation of gift trusts129 in favor of
disabled persons because of both a humanitarian desire to improve the
lives of disabled persons and a desire to reduce the dependency of such
persons on the state for care.130 Unlimited access by creditors would
discourage potential settlors from making gift trusts in favor of dis-
abled persons, thus resulting in a loss to disabled persons in general. 3
In recognition of the public policy encouraging gift trusts in favor of
disabled persons, the California Probate Code rule allowing for credi-
tor access to discretionary trusts set up by the parent of the beneficiary
127. Cf id. (discussion of general tort law policy considerations).
128. Cf Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 32-33 (1976) (some
hospitals deny care, even emergency care, to persons unable to demonstrate an ability to pay).
129. A gift trust, or gratuitous trust, is one set up either inter-vivos or under a will as a gift to
the beneficiary. Cf BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 422, 768 (5th ed. 1933).
130. See Sartain, supra note 32, at 610; Frolik, supra note 24, at 366-67.
131. See Sartain, supra note 32, at 610; Frolik, supra note 24, at 366-67.
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contains an exception for a disabled child beneficiary.13 2 Under the
Code, if the beneficiary possesses a disability, the creditors cannot
reach the trust even if the beneficiary's parent settled the trust.133 The
exemption encourages trust gifts to disabled persons.' 3 4
Allowing collection against settlement trusts does not contravene
this public policy of encouraging gifts in trust for disabled persons.
Collection as proposed here would be limited only to settlement trusts,
and not to testamentary or inter-vivos gift trusts. By limiting such
access to the settlement trust only, persons wishing to create discre-
tionary or supplemental support trusts for the benefit of disabled per-
sons, either as inter-vivos or testamentary gifts, will not be
discouraged from doing so. Only settlement trusts will be discour-
aged; gift trusts will remain safe from creditor claims.
C. Proposed Legislative Amendment to the Washington Trusts
Statutes
An amendment to the Washington trusts statutes allowing for credi-
tor access can resolve the problems arising from not allowing creditor
access to trusts created in settlement of injury claims. A legislative
amendment to the Revised Code of Washington Title 11, Probate and
Trust Law' provides the best vehicle to make trusts in settlement of
legal claims accessible by creditors. Important Washington trust law
already resides in that section, including exceptions to the statutory
spendthrift rule. 3 6 Suggested language for such an amendment could
be as follows:
Persons or organizations that provide necessities or support to a trust
beneficiary shall have access to trust funds established for the benefici-
ary, if the trust fund was established for the beneficiary in settlement or
compromise of, or judgment on, a personal injury claim by the benefici-
ary or the beneficiary's guardian. Access by such persons or organiza-
tions to such trust funds, including through execution, levy or
attachment, shall be allowed notwithstanding any trustee discretion or
132. See supra notes 31-33.
133. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text. Section 15306(b) of the California statute
makes an exception for a disabled child beneficiary, upholding the discretionary language and
barring the state's claim for support. The rationale for upholding the discretion language lies in
the public policy of encouraging trust gifts to disabled persons. If courts ignored discretion
language, fewer trusts would be set up for disabled persons because of the fear of state
attachment of the funds. Sartain, supra note 32, at 609-10 (quoting policy from the California
Law Revision Commission).
134. Sartain, supra note 32, at 609-10.
135. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11 (West 1987).
136. Id. § 11.96.150.
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supplemental support provisions in the trust instrument, and regardless
of whether the beneficiary has a future interest in the trust corpus. In
addition, such trusts shall be includable in the beneficiary's bankruptcy
estate. This section shall not apply to any trust, whether inter-vivos or
testamentary, established as a gift to the beneficiary.
This amendment would solve the problems inherent in denial of credi-
tor access and provide a more fair and logical approach to the problem
of parties attempting to avoid legitimate creditor claims.
III. CONCLUSION
In Washington, creditors currently have no c2ear access to trust
funds created in settlement of personal injury claims. Parties to a per-
sonal injury lawsuit should not be able to use disc:retionary or supple-
mental trusts to insulate the settlement proceeds from the claims of
care providers to the injured person. The Erickson case takes a step in
the right direction by allowing creditor access to discretionary support
trusts. But the case stands on too narrow a holding to prevent circum-
vention of creditor claims through the use of pure discretionary trusts
and supplemental trusts. Consequently, in Washington, creditors
must resort to negotiation or litigation in attempting to obtain
payment.
The unsettled and undesirable status of creditors' collection rights
should be resolved in favor of creditor access for several reasons.
First, trusts created in settlement of legal claims are self-settled and
therefore should not be insulated from creditor claims. Second, a sup-
port relationship often exists between settlor and beneficiary in a set-
tlement situation, and trusts should not be used by the parties to abuse
or alter the support relationship. Third, double recovery may occur if
creditor claims are denied. Lastly, the unresolved nature of the cur-
rent law works against creditors, producing uncertainty, extra cost,
and unfairness for creditors. Therefore, creditor collection should be
allowed against settlement trusts. An amendment to the Washington
trusts statutes would be an effective way to correct the problems inher-
ent in denial of collection.
Brad John Berkness
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